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28 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NI

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: NSC on Korea
27 April 1977

At the NSC meeting on Korea, General Brown took up the theme which you and I had injected into the PRC meeting on Korea last week -- that of giving the President a good evaluation of the risks and benefits of both pulling out and the possible ameliorative measures in so doing. He clearly indicated it was not his opinion that this had been done.

1. It is my view that we should develop a much more useful paper than the two-page one that I saw shortly before getting into that NSC meeting. It is also my view that we should specifically address our evaluation of the impact on the various parties concerned, e.g., Japan, China, North and South Korea, of the various offsetting measures that are proposed. Those measures as I understood them were:

a. Reaffirming our intent to maintain Naval and Air Force forces in the Far East.

b. Coming up with a phased reduction program rather than a sudden withdrawal.

c. Public reaffirmation of our commitment to the defense of South Korea, indicating that the residual South Korean forces will be the equivalent of what has been there between US and the South Koreans in capability.

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d. Indicating a commitment to refurbish the South Korean military forces. It is necessary to build up their capability to an equivalency of what is there now, this to be done largely by South Korean procurement with their own funds from the United States, but perhaps partly with the leaving behind of equipment from the division we withdraw. (The question of Congressional approval for either type of action must be considered.)

2. Working with State, I think we should continue to develop the paper we set out to produce after the PRC meeting.

STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy